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Abstract
We study the supply function auction for an asymmetric oligopoly with uncertain linear demand function and linear 
marginal cost functions of producers. We examine existence of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) in the model and 
convergence of the best response dynamics to this equilibrium. We show that the dynamics converges to the SFE for a 
duopoly, but in general the SFE and the strong best response do not exist in the model.
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1. Introduction
The present paper considers a model of the supply function auction under a linear and uncertain demand 
function and linear marginal cost functions of producers. The literature on supply function auctions usually 
studies symmetric oligopolies. A corresponding model was introduced by Klemperer and Meyer [9] and 
developed in later papers [1-5], [8], [10-12], [15]. In this model, a bid of a producer is a monotone smooth 
function of the price and a demand function depends on an uncertain parameter besides the price. For each 
parameter value, the market clearing price is determined from the balance of the aggregate supply function and 
the current demand function. A bid profile is called a supply function equilibrium (SFE) if, for any demand 
realization, the bid of each firm maximizes its profit under fixed bids of other producers. Klemperer and Meyer 
[9] derive a necessary condition for an equilibrium bid as a differential equation and describe the set of SFE. 
Green and Newbery [5] obtain an explicit formula of the SFE for a symmetric oligopoly with linear marginal 
cost and demand functions. Holmberg and Newbery [7] show that, under an inelastic demand and binding 
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capacity constraints, there exists a unique SFE in the model. Rudkevich [13] considers the supply function 
auction for an asymmetric oligopoly with linear marginal cost functions and zero fixed marginal costs. The 
paper establishes existence of the unique SFE with linear supply functions and convergence of the best 
response dynamics to this equilibrium. Anderson and Hu [2] show that an SFE with a jump of the supply 
function at price p may exist only if all the other producers with positive outputs reach their capacity 
constraints at this price and for one producer his fixed marginal cost coincides with it. Holmberg [6] studies the 
social welfare at the SFE depending on the number of producers and their asymmetry characteristic. Our paper 
studies the supply function auction with linear marginal cost functions under different fixed marginal costs of 
producers. We focus on the strong best response dynamics (SBRD) examination. We determine the price 
intervals where the SBRD exists and show its convergence to the SFE for each interval. We also establish 
existence of the SBRD and its convergence to the SFE without price constraints for a duopoly. However, if the 
permitted price interval covers the fixed marginal cost of producer 2!i (ordered by the fixed marginal cost 
increase), the SBR of the first producer does not exist in the second period.
2. Oligopoly with linear marginal cost functions of producers
Consider supply function auction model introduced by [9], for an asymmetric oligopoly with n producers. 
Each producer i is characterized by cost function )(qCi of production volume q with standard properties 
0>)(' qC i , 0)('' tqC i for all 0tq , ],[1,= nNi  . Demand function ),( tpD depends on price 
p and random parameter t . The demand function meets the following conditions: 0<pD , 0dppD ,
0=ptD , 0>tD . Each participant Ni submits his strategy which is a smooth non-decreasing supply 
function )( pSi . It determines the volume of electricity producer i proposes to supply depending on the 
market price p . The producers don’t know the demand random parameter t when setting their strategies. Once 
parameter t becomes a common knowledge, a strategy profile ))(),..,(),((= 21 pSpSpSS n determines the 
price ),( tSp balancing the demand and the aggregate supply function: ))((=))((
1=
tpStpD i
n
i¦ . If the 
market clearing price does not exist or is not unique, then no production takes place and the participants have 
zero profits. Producers aim to maximize their profit functions: 
))(),(())(),((=),( pStpDCpStpDptp iiii  S , where )(=)( pSpS jiji ¦ z is a total supply 
function of all players except i . A strategy profile ),(= NiSS i 


is a supply function equilibrium (SFE),
if for all 0tt and Ni , )),,(( tSSArgmaxS iiiiSi


  S . First order condition for profit maximization is 
0.=)))(),(('))(('),(()(),( pStpDCppStpDpStpD iiipi  c
For smooth supply functions, Anderson and Hu [2] obtain a necessary condition for a strategy profile to be a 
supply function equilibrium as a system of differential equations:
.1,..,=),,(
))((
)(=)(' nitpD
pSCp
pSpS p
ii
i
i cc
(1)
Consider a model with linear marginal cost functions of producers ],[1,=,=)( 10 nNiqccqC iii c ,
and linear demand function dptDtpD )(=),( . For this case, the system (1) is: 
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nid
pSccp
pSpS
iii
i
i 1,..,=,)(
)(=)(' 10 
(2)
Since there are no capacity constraints, system (2) provides the necessary condition for SFE in the area 
where functions )( pSi , ni 1,..,= , are smooth.
3. Strong best response dynamics
Strategy )( pSa is a strong best response to competitors’ strategies )( pS a , if for each ],[ ttt the price 
)(tp , balancing the demand ),( tpD and aggregate supply )()( pSpS aa  , provides maximum of the 
producer’s profit: 
)))}.()((())(),({(max),,( pStpDCppStpDtSSp aa
p
aa  o
We study the best response dynamics for the repeated auction with 2tn producers. In each period 
1,2,...=W producer a sets his bid ),( WpSa as a strong best response to the competitors’ bids 
1),(  WpS a
&
in the previous period.
For the case where 0== 00 cci for all Ni , Rudkevich [13] shows, that the best response dynamics 
converges to the unique SFE of the static model. Consider the case where the fixed components of producers’ 
marginal cost functions differ. Without loss of generality, assume that producers Ni are ordered by the 
increase of their fixed marginal costs: 0ic :
00
2
0
1 <<< nccc  . We study the best response dynamics in the 
separate price intervals ),( 0 1
0
ii cc , since, as it is shown below, the SBRD for the whole domain does not exist 
already in the second period.
Let the starting bid be 0=,0)( pSa , for all Na . The SBR of a producer in the first period is
°¯
°
®
­
d
t


.0,
,,
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=,1)(
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0
1
0
a
a
a
a
a
cpfor
cpfor
dc
cpd
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The BRD is special for each of the price intervals Niccp ii   ),,(
0
1
0 , since passing to the next price
interval changes the set of players for whom bidding in the auction is profitable (possible market clearing 
prices are greater or equal to their fixed marginal costs). Let producer’s a bid in the interval i for the period W
be of the following form: iaaa NacpikpS  ),)(,(=),(
0WW , ),( 1 ii ccp , where ^ `iaaNi d=
is a set of active players in this interval. For iNNa \ , 0=),( WpSa . Producer’s a strong best response to 
the rivals’ strategies aNjpS ij \),,( W in the interval i maximizes his profit: 
)}.)1,(),(())1,(),(({arg=),)1(),(( \\
1
\ 
dd
WWWW pStpDCpStpDpmaxtSSp aNaaN
icpic
aNa
a
i iii
The bid ),( WpSa provides an optimal price for any value of parameter t such that the price value stays 
within the interval i .
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Proposition 1 Bid 
))((1
)(
)(=)(
\
1
\0
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ikd
cppS
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i
i


 , where )()( \
1\
ikik j
aiN
aNi ¦ , of producer 
a is a unique strong best response to the competitors’ bids aNjcpikpS ijjj \),)((=)(
0  in the 
interval Niccp ii   ),,(
0
1
0 .
Proof: According to [13], the first order condition for profit maximization gives: 
))1,((1
)1,(
)(=),(
\
1
\0
ikdc
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i
i



W
W
W . Thus, the SBRD in the interval i looks like 
iaaa NacpikpS  ),)(,(=),(
0WW , where
,)
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1(=),( 11
\

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a cikd
ik
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W
W iNa (3)
The vector form of Equ. (3) is )),((=),1( ikik WW
&
) . Proceeding from [13], Lemma 2, we obtain the 
following result on convergence of the SBRD in each interval i , ni ,,1 (assuming f 
0
1nc ). Consider 
system (4) for a fixed point of the dynamics (3):
))((=)( ikik
&
) (4)
Proposition 2 For every i , the system (4) has a unique solution 0>)(* ik . For any initial point (3) 
0>),(0 ik , the sequence ),( ik W
&
converges to )(* ik .
This result implies that in each period there exists a strong best response in each interval i ,  and the 
sequence of BR profiles converges to the SFE for foW . However, the combination of all the BR functions 
for all the intervals in the single bid is not the best response to the competitors’ bids. Examine 3tn and the 
second period of the dynamics. Fig.1 shows the total supply of producers n,2, and the residual demand for 
the producer 1. 
Fig. 1. The best response supply functions and the residual demand function for the first player at 2=W
Assume that 1ac , na ,1,=  are small. Denote t the value corresponding to the price H
0
3c . Consider 
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the residual demand faced by the first producer for 2=W , tt = (Fig. 1). Now we show that ,2)(1 pS is not 
the BR for ,1)(1 pS under tt = . The increase of ,2)(1 pS up to the value 1),()(
0
32
0
3 cScD  in the 
neighbourhood of the point 03c shifts the market clearing price to the left semi-neighbourhood of the point 
0
3c .
Under almost the same market price equal to 03c , the jump of the sales volume provides the profit growth.
Therefore, already in the second period the SBR does not exist under general assumptions. This result 
conforms to the proposition in [2] implying absence of SFE in the considered model. The only exception is the 
case of duopoly. Then the residual demand function stays continuous and concave for 0> icp for all t and W
for the both agents.
Proposition 3 Let ^ `3,1,2=N .
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and the SBRD f 021 }),(,),({ WWW pSpS converges to the pair of bids:
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corresponding to the SFE.
Proceeding from Lemma 5 in [2] on uniqueness of the SFE under an unbounded demand random component, 
we may conclude that this equilibrium is unique.
In order to complete our study of linear oligopoly, we should consider the case when 3tn and fixed costs 
are the same for several producers. If there are at least 3 different values of 0ic , then the situation is similar to 
the case on Fig. 1 for any price interval including some ,02
0 cic ! the SBR for 2=W and SFE do not exist. 
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Moreover, if there are several producers with the minimal fixed marginal cost 002
0
1 mccc     , then the 
same proposition is true for any price interval including the next value 0 1mc . The next proposition considers 
the only case where the SBRD exist.
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0)0( !ik , Ni . Then, for any 1,2,=W , there exist SBR bids determined as follows: in the interval 
),( 02
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The mapping ))1((=)( WW kFk
&&
has a unique static point and the SBRD converges to this static point.
4. Conclusion
Our study shows that properties of the supply function auction for the oligopoly with linear demand and 
marginal cost functions essentially depend on the fixed marginal costs of the producers. If these costs are the 
same for all producers (may be, except for one with the smallest cost), then the SBRD for such an auction 
converges to the SFE with linear supply functions. Proceeding from [13], the rate of convergence is rather high. 
However, in general the SBR exists in the price intervals limited by different marginal costs, but does not exist 
if there are no price constraints. This result confirms our conclusion in the previous paper [14] about rather 
limited possibilities for efficient implementation of the supply function auction under uncertain demand in 
practice.
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